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Introduction
A growing number of quarterly earnings press releases call attention to an unorthodox measure of corporate profitability-called "pro forma" or "cash" earnings-instead of the officially sanctioned GAAP earnings number firms are required to report every three months. There is at present no agreed-upon definition of pro forma earnings.
1 Firms are free to develop their own formula for calculating pro forma earnings because these press release "interpretations" of GAAP earnings are unregulated and not audited. Some firms calculate and report a pro forma earnings figure that excludes nonrecurring gains or losses from GAAP earnings. Other firms also exclude ongoing intangible -asset amortization and stock compensation expenses. Still others exclude routine expenses for depreciation, interest, payroll taxes and marketing costs. Until recently, there also was no requirement that firms disclose the details of their pro forma calculations. This disparity between GAAP earnings and the number firms highlight in news releases has led some critics to refer pejoratively to pro forma earnings as "earnings excluding all the bad stuff" or EEBS (Fox 1998) .
There are at least two potential reasons for the popularity of pro forma earnings. One possibility is that pro forma numbers are a more accurate depiction of economic performance than is bottom line GAAP earnings. As one equity analyst argues, "the reported [GAAP] profits figure is now considered an accounting fiction" because it frequently includes nonrecurring items and other (unspecified) accrual accounting distortions (MacDonald 1999a) . Company management echoes this theme: "We're just trying to give people a better idea of our operating results. That's what any pro forma earnings tries to do." 2 A more perverse explanation for why firms report pro forma earnings is simply that doing so allows them to appear more profitable than they truly are. According to one observer, "Way too often, [pro forma results] seem to be used to distract investors from the actual results." 3 Firms can presumably transform GAAP losses into pro forma profits, or claim they have 1 There is also no agreed-upon label for these non-GAAP earnings figures. We use the term "pro forma earnings" to mean any non-GAAP profitability measure that is the central focus of the firm's quarterly earnings press release (subject to the sample selection procedures described later) and without regard to the label used by the firm itself.
exceeded analysts' earnings expectations when the GAAP earnings number indicates they have fallen short. Critics argue that pro forma numbers mislead investors when legitimate expenses are excluded and when calculation details are not explained (Tergesen 1999; Krantz 2001; Weil 2001 ).
This paper has two objectives. First, we document the frequency and magnitude of pro forma earnings in press releases issued during June through August 2000, and describe the firms that engaged in this financial disclosure strategy. Second, we present evidence on whether investors are misled by pro forma earnings disclosures. To investigate this question, we use a market multiples approach (Liu, Nissim and Thomas 2000; Bhojraj and Lee 2002) to test for fundamental mispricing of the shares of firms that report pro forma earnings. We also examine the behavior of stock returns at quarterly earnings announcement dates when pro forma earnings numbers are disclosed. These two approaches complement one another, and allow us to examine whether deviations from fundamental prices occur in conjunction with the disclosure of pro forma earnings numbers.
Our results indicate that the income increasing pro forma adjustments managers make to GAAP earnings are large in magnitude, encompass more than just the elimination of
Compustat-defined nonrecurring items, and often exceed the adjustments made by analyst tracking services. However, we find no evidence that pro forma firms are priced differently by investors than are firms that disclose only GAAP earnings. This means that share prices, on average, do not behave as if investors just focus myopically on press release headlines when evaluating a company's earnings performance. Instead, investors appear to consider other information contained in the press release and price firms accordingly.
This paper adds to the growing academic literature on pro forma earnings. There are two distinct strands to the literature. One strand is represented by studies investigating the properties of "Street" earnings; i.e., the adjusted earnings per share numbers prepared and distributed by analyst tracking services since the late 1980s (Bagnoli, Eskew, and Watts 2001; Brown and Sivakumar, 2001; Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman 2002) . These adjusted earnings numbers are not reported in firms' earnings press releases, and thus "Street" earnings numbers are not part of the disclosure strategies firms use. A second strand is represented by studies that use actual pro forma (i.e., non-GAAP) earnings numbers constructed by management and highlighted in press releases issued by the firms themselves (Lougee and Marquardt 2002; Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen and Larson 2002) . These are the pro forma earnings numbers that have attracted financial press criticism and regulatory concern, and that are the focus of our study. Lougee and Marquardt (2002) identify firm characteristics associated with the use a pro forma disclosure strategy, and compare the information content of pro forma earnings to that of two GAAP earnings measures. Bhattacharya, et al. (2002) also provide evidence on the relative information content of pro forma and GAAP earnings, and they include a "Street" earnings number for completeness. In addition, Bhattacharya, et al. (2002) examine the relative impact of each earnings measures on analysts' forecast revisions. By contrast, this study provides direct evidence on whether investors price pro forma firms differently from the way in which they price other firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Descriptive evidence regarding the pro forma earnings phenomenon is presented in Section 2 along with pertinent institutional details. After describing the phenomenon, we turn our attention to why firms use pro forma numbers to strategically report their accounting earnings outcomes. This discussion then serves as a basis for developing predications about the equity valuation implications of pro forma earnings disclosures. Section 3 describes the sample and presents descriptive evidence on pro forma earnings disclosures. Section 4 develops our tests for fundamental mispricing and reports the test results. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
Strategic Reporting of Earnings Outcomes in Press Releases
The term "pro forma" is Latin for "as a matter of form." In accounting, pro forma has traditionally meant the presentation of financial data where certain amounts are hypothetical.
These hypothetical amounts can relate to proposed or recently completed business transactions, or to retroactive accounting adjustments. For example, Regulation S-X of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires publicly traded firms to furnish pro forma financial information in connection with business combinations and spin-offs, when a significant portion of a business is sold, and to illustrate the effect of receiving funds from a proposed security offering. Pro forma information is also required when firms change certain accounting principles (APB Opinion No. 20) , correct errors in previously issued financial statements (APB Opinion No. 9), or use the "purchase" method of accounting for a business combination (APB Opinion No. 16).
According to the SEC, this kind of pro forma financial information is intended to:
"… provide investors with information about the continuing impact of a particular transaction by showing how it might have affected historical financial statements if the transaction had been consummated at an earlier time." (Rule 11-02(a) of Regulation S-X)
In other words, the goal of traditional pro forma accounting is to recast previously reported financial statement amounts "as if" the business transaction or accounting event had transpired in an earlier period. Explanatory notes describing each of the pro forma adjustments are required so that readers "examining the statements will be fully apprised as to which items in it are based on fact and which on assumption. Without such disclosure a pro forma statement is meaningless and deceptive" (Herz, et al. 1997, page 949) .
Pro Forma Earnings as a Disclosure Strategy
This paper focuses on pro forma financial disclosures of a different sort. These pro forma disclosures are prominently featured in quarterly earnings press releases and present current period "earnings" computed using methodologies other than GAAP. Elsewhere in the release, Yahoo! says its second quarter GAAP earnings totaled $65,459,000 ($0.11 per share), compared to a GAAP net loss of $263,00 ($0.00 per share) for the same quarter of the previous year.
Several features of the Yahoo! Inc. press release illustrate aspects common to pro forma earnings disclosures. First, by highlighting pro forma earnings in the press release headline and lead paragraph Yahoo! management has chosen to draw attention to an earnings number that is not traditional GAAP earnings. Second, the quarterly pro forma earnings numbers highlighted in the Yahoo! press release are both larger than their GAAP counterparts, and transform a year-ago GAAP loss into a year-ago pro forma "profit". Finally, the pro forma adjustments made to GAAP earnings are described in general terms but the full press release does not provide details of the adjustments or their impact on individual financial statement line items.
Firms registered on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the Nasdaq are required to publish the current quarter's GAAP earnings along with a comparable GAAP earnings figure for the same period of the previous year (e.g., see New
York Stock Exchange (2001), para. 203.02). There are, however, few other formal guidelines regarding the content of quarterly earnings press releases except that they must not contain counterfactual or materially misleading information. 4 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), in particular, has no authority or responsibility for regulating the content of corporate press releases. Moreover, the pro forma earnings disclosures firms highlight in their press releases do not typically appear in their SEC filings. 5 In other words, firms can publish interpretations of their GAAP results and they have considerable discretion over how their profit performance is portrayed. This discretion can be used to strategically shape perceptions of the quarterly earnings outcome by highlighting a pro forma profit figure while down playing the GAAP earnings number.
Why do firms report "pro forma" earnings?
Two explanations for the growing popularity of pro forma earnings among managers are evident in financial press. One possibility is that managers use the announcement strategy to better communicate the firm's true economic performance to investors and other readers.
Managers have incentives to make financial reports informative and transparent for readers (Healy and Wahlen 1999) . Managers who adopt a "pro forma" announcement strategy for this purpose must hold three beliefs. First, managers must believe that presenting the GAAP earnings number without comment is misleading because significant val uation irrelevant, transitory, and less persistent components of GAAP earnings would not be apparent to readers. 6 This belief seems plausible if readers cannot easily identify such items from other sources or assess their relevance once they are identifie d. Second, managers must believe that presenting a single pro forma measure of quarterly earnings performance is more effective than a piece-meal approach to disclosure. Third, managers must believe that readers will rely on the pro forma earnings figure that mangers present rather than on the required GAAP figure or some other measure of the firm's earnings outcome. Managers 4 In April 2001, the National Investor Relations Institute and the Financial Executives Institute (FEI) jointly issued voluntary "best practices" guidelines for pro forma reporting (FEI 2001) . Later that year, the SEC required companies that release pro forma figures to indicate the basis of their pro forma presentation by providing in the quarterly earnings press release clear and detailed descriptions of the adjustments made to GAAP earnings (SEC 2001) . Our sample period predates this guidance.
5 In a randomly selected subsample of twenty press releases where our sample firms used the "pro forma" label, only one 10-Q filing contained the reported pro forma earnings information.
6 Persistent components of earnings should receive more weight than transitory or irrelevant earnings components in predicting future earnings and in determining firm value (Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Easton and Zmijewski 1989; Freeman and Tse 1992). have no incentive to present pro forma earnings if they believe readers will ignore the adjusted numbers.
A second explanation for the popularity of pro forma earnings is that managers use this announcement strategy to obscure the firm's true economic performance. Managers have incentives to avoid reporting earnings declines, losses, and disappointments (Barth, Elliott and Finn 1999; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 1999; Matsunaga and Park, 2001; Skinner 1997; Skinner and Sloan 1999) . The penalties associated with reporting unfavorable earnings outcomes can presumably be softened either by managing actual earnings or by managing readers' perception of earnings (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Schrand and Walther 2000) . Managers who opt for this latter approach and use a "pro forma" announcement strategy must hold two beliefs. First, managers must believe that the pro forma strategy will successfully transform the perception of a "bad"
GAAP earnings quarter into a "better" pro forma quarter. In other words, managers must believe that there is some probability readers will rely on pro forma earnings (rather than GAAP earnings or some other earnings figure) to evaluate the firm's quarterly earnings performance. This belief seems plausible if readers "functionally fixate" on the earnings number displayed most prominently in the press release. Second, managers must believe that the penalties they face if the strategy unravels are inconsequential. This belief seems reasonable because managers have considerable latitude over the content of quarterly earnings press releases.
Implications for equity valuation.
The discussion thus far has been silent about whose perceptions managers are attempting to influence through their earnings announcement strategies. We assume that equity investors are the likely targets of the pro forma reporting strategy. Accordingly, we provide evidence on how investors respond to pro forma earnings by analyzing cross-sectional differences in share price levels and in price reactions to earnings announcements. The intuition behind our analysis is straightforward. Managers who use a pro forma strategy to more accurately communicate the firm's true performance are doing so to avoid the possibility that investors might otherwise under-price the shares. On the other hand, pro forma earnings announcements that obscure firm performance are presumably intended to induce investors to over-price the shares. Hand's (1990) where E P2 is a value relevant persistent expense component to GAAP earnings (E P2 < 0). As before, management can adopt a GAAP disclosure strategy that prominently features E P , or a "pro forma" strategy that features E P1 . Sophisticated investors discover both persistent earnings components and price the firm's shares accordingly. Unsophisticated investors, however, will assign too high a price to the firm's shares if the fail to recognize that recurring expense items have been omitted from the pro forma earnings number.
Our price tests rely on comparisons between firms that adopt a pro forma disclosure strategy and benchmark firms that do not. If managers are unsuccessful in using the pro forma strategy to avoid a price penalty associated with a transitory expense, the shares of pro forma firms will be under-priced relative to those of benchmark firms. If managers are successful in misleading unsophisticated investors, the shares of pro forma firms will be over-priced when compared to those of benchmark firms. Otherwise, the share prices of pro forma firms should be valued, on average, similarly to those of benchmark firms. Evidence indicating that pro forma firms are priced higher than benchmark firms would be consistent with the notion that unsophisticated investors are misled by pro forma earnings disclosures.
A second implication of our analysis is that any share price differences attributable to the use of a pro forma disclosure strategy should be apparent at the earnings announcement date when pro forma results are first disclosed. Consequently, we also compare the earnings announcement stock returns of pro forma and benchmark firms for evidence of a differential response to earnings information. Of course, if differences in share prices or returns are detected, then those differences should also be correlated with characteristics of the pro forma disclosure strategy.
Sample Selection
The electronic text search capability of Dow Jones Interactive was used to identify candidate earnings releases published between June 1, 2000 and August 31, 2000. Our goal was to obtain a comprehensive picture of the pro forma earnings disclosure phenomenon at a particular point in time. The sample selection process involved three steps. First, quarterly earnings releases in which the words "pro forma", "cash" or "cash basis" appeared adjacent to "earnings", "EPS", "net income", "loss" or "net loss" were identified. Each release was then read and retained if: (a) the pro forma adjustment was to GAAP earnings for the current quarter rather than a prior quarter; (b) pro forma earnings was featured prominently in the news release headline and lead paragraph; (c) the release was not issued by a bank or other financial services firm, or a foreign-domiciled company; and (d) the firm was listed on the NYSE or AMEX exchange or the Nasdaq that quarter. The first two filters serve as our operational definition of the pro forma earnings phenomenon and require that the firm's news release highlight a non-GAAP earnings number for the current quarter. The third filter excludes cases where pro forma earnings numbers are disclosed for regulatory reasons or because of differences in cross-border accounting practices.
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The exchange-listing requirement was imposed to ensure the availability of data for subsequent test purposes.
The second step in the sample selection process was to calibrate the text strings used to identify sample firms. To do so we examined the second quarter earnings releases issued by 7 Banks, for example, routinely disclose a "cash earnings" number in addition to their GAAP earnings for the quarter. The pro forma adjustments made to arrive at this "cash earnings" figure eliminate GAAP accounting practices that are not required under regulatory accounting principles. The result is a pro forma earnings figure that corresponds to the quarterly addition (or reduction) to the bank's regulatory capital. each of the 238 "cash EPS" firms identified by First Call Corporation.
8 Only 48.3 percent of these firms highlighted pro forma earnings numbers described using words captured by our original search strings. Another 13.5 percent disclosed only GAAP earnings numbers in their press releases. The remaining 38.2 percent of the releases featured prominently a pro forma earnings number described using phrases such as "adjusted" net income or loss, earnings "before noncash charges", or earnings "excluding" one or more GAAP accrual items. This language seemed to also play an important role in firms' quarterly earnings disclosure strategies. Accordingly, the third and final step in the sample selection process involved expanding the electronic text search of June through August 2000 earnings releases to capture releases highlighting variations of these descriptions. 
What earnings outcome measures are firms reporting?
This section documents the frequency and magnitude of pro forma earnings in press releases issued following the second calendar quarter of 2000. Table 1 describes the pro forma earnings discl osures made by sample firms. Panel A compares the magnitude of pro forma quarterly earnings and EPS to the GAAP numbers reported by sample firms and to adjusted "actual" earnings and EPS reported by Zacks Investment Research. 10 The median sample firm has quarterly pro forma earnings of $2.305 million, a GAAP loss of -$1.544
8 In response to pressure from Wall Street analysts, First Call began compiling and distributing analysts' quarterly "cash earnings" forecasts-defined as GAAP earnings excluding goodwill amortization-for twenty Internet firms in April 1999 (MacDonald 1999b). By May 2000, the number of "cash earnings' firms had grown to more than 160. First Call provided us with their May 2000 list of 238 active and potential "cash earnings" firms broken down into three categories: 166 firms (69.8 percent) where analysts supplied only "cash EPS" forecasts; 51 firms (21.4 percent) where some (but not all) analysts supplied "cash EPS" forecasts in addition to their traditional EPS forecasts; and 21 firms (8.8 percent) that might be "cash EPS" candidates in the future but where analysts still supplied traditional EPS forecasts. Of these 238 firms, only 207 (87.0 percent) issued quarterly earnings press releases during our sample period. We use the term "traditional EPS forecasts" rather than "GAAP EPS forecasts" because there is ample evidence to indicate that analysts do not always target the GAAP earnings number when forecasting quarterly earnings (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan 2002).
9 Our pro forma sample does not include earnings releases that mentioned "EBITDA" (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) or "EBITDAR" (EBITDA excluding rent expense). Pro forma adjustments of this sort have now become a common element of sell-side analysts' research reports and of firms' earnings disclosure strategies. For example, more than 70 percent of sell-side analysts' reports now contain an EBITDA valuation multiple (MacDonald 1999a). Our text search of June through August 2000 earnings releases uncovered 2,197 cases where EBITDA or EBITDAR was mentioned at least once in the published press release. This compares to 2,446 cases during June through August of 1999, and 503 cases during this same period in 1995. EIBTDA and EBITDAR firms are included in our benchmark sample of GAAP firms described later in the paper.
million or -$0.610 million excluding Compustat-identified nonrecurring items, and Zacks "actual" earnings of $1.906 million. Untabulated results indicate that only 36.3 percent of sample firms report a pro forma loss for the quarter, whereas 54.7 percent report a GAAP loss and 39.2 percent have a Zacks "actual" loss. Eighty-nine firms (20.5 percent) report a GAAP loss but pro forma profits, and eighteen firms (4.2 percent) report a pro forma loss but GAAP profits. On a per share basis, the median pro forma earnings is $0.07, the GAAP per share loss is -$0.08 or -$0.032 before Compustat-identified nonrecurring items, and
Zacks "actual" EPS is $0.06.
Figure 1 provides additional information on the properties of pro forma EPS. Figure 1a depicts the median pro forma EPS, GAAP EPS, adjusted GAAP EPS (which excludes
Compustat-identified nonrecurring items), and Zacks "actual" EPS for each of twenty groups of sample firms ranked by GAAP EPS. Firms with the lowest quarterly GAAP EPS are assigned to group 1 while those with the highest GAAP EPS are assigned to group 20.
Three features of the figure are noteworthy. First, GAAP EPS lies below pro forma EPS in every case except for group 20. This means that income-increasing pro forma adjustments to GAAP earnings dominate the sample, although a small number of highly profitable firms sometimes make income-decreasing pro forma adjustments. Second, the pro forma adjustments firms make to GAAP earnings go far beyond just eliminating any Compustat nonrecurring items. Third, Zacks "actual" EPS tracks closely the pro forma EPS amounts reported by our sample firms (e.g., pro forma EPS equals Zacks "actual" EPS in 58.7 percent of the sample).
Panel A of Table 1 sheds light on the divergence of pro forma EPS from Zacks "actual"
EPS for the 41.3 percent of the sample for which pro forms EPS does not equal Zacks "actual" EPS. The median firm in this subsample has quarterly pro forma EPS of $0.19 compared to GAAP EPS of $0.08, adjusted GAAP EPS of $0.09 and Zacks "actual" EPS of $0.13. Zacks makes no adjustment to reported GAAP EPS for eighty-five of these firms (47.4 percent). Figure 1b depicts the difference in median pro forma EPS and two "actual"
EPS amounts-adjusted GAAP earnings per share and Zacks "actual" EPS-for groups ranked by Zacks EPS. As these data clearly show, median pro forma EPS lies above the adjusted GAAP and Zacks "actual" EPS amounts. This means that the income-increasing pro forma adjustments to GAAP earnings made by sample firms go beyond just the elimination of Compustat-defined special items, and are often larger than the proprietary adjustments made by Zacks.
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Panel B of Table 1 pro forma amounts one quarter earlier and only 11 percent had disclosed pro forma amounts for more than four quarters prior to our sample period. Table 2 reports selected characteristics of sample firms. Panel A contrasts the economic sector composition of the pro forma sample to that of "all firms". 12 Although 70.8 percent of the pro forma firms belong to the "Computer and technology" sector, every other economic sector is represented except for "Auto, tires and trucks". 13 Panel B shows that Nasdaq firms comprise 78.7 percent of the sample, a result consistent with the concentration of pro forma firms in the computer and technology sector. Panel C indicates that pro forma firms are less profitable (GAAP and Zacks EPS) but larger (market capitalization) than firms which only disclosed GAAP EPS during the sample period. Pro forma firms also tend to be more risky (market beta) with less equity ownership by insiders, higher growth expectations (market-tobook ratio and analysts' growth forecasts), and more coverage by sell-side analysts. Pro forma firms and GAAP firms appear similar in terms of trailing 12-month sales, institutional ownership, and number of shareholders.
In summary, these results show that the income-increasing pro forma adjustments managers make to GAAP earnings are large in magnitude, encompass more than just the elimination of Compustat-defined nonrecurring items, and often exceed the adjustments made by analyst tracking services.
How "Pro Forma" Earnings Are Priced
A market-multiples approach (Liu, Nissim and Thomas 2000; Bhojraj and Lee 2002 ) is used to test for fundamental mispricing of the shares of pro forma earnings firms. This approach involves estimating multiple regression models that attempt to explain the crosssectional variation in enterprise-value-to-sales (EVS), price-to-book (PB), and price-toearnings (PE) ratios. The goal is to develop reasonably parsimonious models that produce a "warranted multiple" (EVS, PB, or PE) for each pro forma firm. These warranted multiples are constructed from regression model parameter estimates for firms that did not use the pro forma disclosure strategy. Consequently, the warranted multiples reflect the large sample relation between a firm's EVS, PB, or PE ratio and variables that should explain crosssectional variations in those ratios. Our mispricing tests are then based on differences between the observed (actual) market-multiples of pro forma firms and warranted multiple estimates.
This approach has several desirable properties. The estimation procedure produces within-sample warranted values that are unbiased and minimum variance. The particular specifications we use incorporate a variety of industry and firm-specific controls, and have been found to explain a substantial portion (often more than 50%) of the cross-sectional variation in share prices for large samples of firms. Using several different market-multiples allows us to triangulate results across different pricing metrics. However, the market-multiples approach is not immune to criticism (Sloan 2002 ), so we also present results based on residual income valuation model specifications.
Estimating the warranted market-multiples.
The estimation sample is comprised of U.S. firms in the Compustat industrial and research files that are also included in the Zacks Investment Research historical database of analysts earnings forecasts, excluding financial services firms. Firms are required to have a consensus forecast of long-term growth from Zacks available in the earnings announcement month. We also eliminate firms with a stock price below $2 per share or trailing twelvemonth sales below $1 million. Pro forma firms are not included in the estimation sample.
The market-multiples valuation models are adapted from Bhojraj and Lee (2002) where M k is the market multiple (k = EVS, PB or PE). Market multiples are formed using the month-end closing stock price from Compustat one month after the firm's quarterly earnings announcement in June though August of 2000. I_EVS is the harmonic mean of the enterprise-value-to-sales ratio for all the firms in the same industry (two-digit SIC code).
I_MB (I_PE) is the harmonic mean of the price-to-book (price-to-earnings) ratio for all firms in the same industry. MARGIN is the industry-adjusted operating profit margin computed as the difference between the firm's profit margin (operating profits divided by sales) and the median industry profit margin. L_MARGIN is an interaction term computed as MARGIN multiplied by an indicator variable that equals 1 if MARGIN is less than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise. I_GROWTH is the industry-adjusted growth forecast computed as the difference between the Zacks consensus growth forecast for the firm and the industry median growth forecast. LEVERAGE is total long-term debt plus preferred stock scaled by the book value of common equity. ROR is the firm's return-on-net-assets (when EVS is the market multiple) or return-on equity (when PB or PE is the market multiple), and RDINT is R&D intensity defined as total research and development expenditures divided by sales.
All financial statement variables are from Compustat and are measured as of the second calendar quarter of 2000 and "annualized" (where appropriate) over the trailing twelvemonths. For example, EVS is total enterprise value-equity plus debt-divided by total sales for the preceding twelve months. The first three explanatory variables control for industry-wide factors that can also influence firm specific market multiples. One of two accounting rates-of-return (ROR) is used depending on whether the market multiple reflects an enterprise or common equity perspective. Return-on-net-assets is trailing twelve-month operating profits divided by net operating assets. Return-on-equity is trailing twelve-month net income before extraordinary items divided by the end of period common equity.
Three different PE multiples are considered in the analysis. One multiple scales share price by trailing twelve-month GAAP net income before extraordinary items, the second multiple eliminates any "special items" from GAAP earnings, while the third multiple uses a trailing twelve-month Zacks "actual" earnings. 14 PE multiples are computed for "loss" firms (PE < 0) as well as profit firms (PE > 0) because companies that use a pro forma earnings announcement strategy often have GAAP losses. Prior research has shown that share prices and returns are more responsive to profits than to losses (Hayn 1995; Collins, Pincus and Xie 1999) . We allow for this possibility by incorporating additional explanatory variables and an intercept term into the PE valuation model. These new variables share a common structure in that each corresponds to one of the original explanatory variables multiplied by NOPROFIT, where NOPROFIT equals 1 if the earnings measure used in the PE multiple is less than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise. Nearly 18 percent of estimation sample firms are characterized by NOPROFIT equal to 1.
A related problem arises when return-on-equity is used as the ROR measure for PB and PE market multiple valuation models. Common equity book value is negative for about 2 percent of estimation sample firms. Rather than delete these observations from the sample, we first compute a return-on-equity ratio using the absolute value of end of period common equity. We then add one more explanatory variable (NEGCE_ROE) to accommodate this feature of the data. NEGCE_ROE is defined as return-on-equity multiplied by an indicator variable (NEGCE) that equals 1 if common equity is negative, and 0 otherwise. Table 3 reports cross-sectional coefficient estimates for the market multiple valuation models.
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A consistently high proportion of the variation in EVS, PB and PE ratios is 14 The industry median PE ratio (I_PE) that functions as an explanatory variable in the valuation model is defined in a manner consistent with the construction of the PE market multiple used as a dependent variable. When the market multiple is EVS or PB, the industry median PE ratio scales share price by trailing twelve-month GAAP net income before extraordinary items. The valuation model coefficient estimates in Table 3 are used to construct "warranted" market multiples for each pro forma firm. 18 We then compute a market multiple prediction error (actual value minus warranted value) for each pro forma firm and valuation model. If investors price pro forma firms in a manner consistent with how estimation sample firms are priced, the warranted multiples will be unbiased estimates of the observed EVS, PB and PE multiples. This means that the prediction errors will, on average, be zero.
To illustrate our approach, consider the prediction errors generated by one of our three PE models. Suppose investors price estimation sample firms by assigning a market multiple of 20 to GAAP earnings. This uniform earnings multiple would be captured in the valuation model coefficient estimate for I_PE, and used to construct a "warranted" market multiple for each pro forma firm. Ignoring the influence of other valuation model variables, the prediction process would yield a "warranted" market multiple of 20 for the GAAP earnings reported by pro forma firms. If investors do indeed price the shares of pro forma firms in the 16 The bivariate correlation between EVS and PB is 0.46 while the correlation between PE multiples and these two market multiples ranges from 0.05 to 0.34. The correlations among PE multiples range from 0.67 to 0.73. Bhojraj and Lee (2002) exclude firms where the share price is below $3, sales are below $100 million, or common equity book value is negative. They restrict their attention to EVS and PB market multiples and do not report results for PE multiples.
17 Multicollinearity is present among the explanatory variables, especially when NOPROFIT interaction terms are included in the PE valuation model. For example, the bivariate correlation among industry median market multiples (I_EVS, I_PB, and I_PE) is about 0.89 while the correlation between MARGIN and ROR measures is about 0.50. However, the correlation between MARGIN and the NOPROFIT * MARGIN interaction term is 0.97 while the correlation between ROR and the NOPROFIT * ROR interaction term is about 0.84. These results indicate that more parsimonious specifications of the market multiple valuation equation can be developed from the current set of explanatory variables. 18 We again eliminate firms with a stock price below $2 per share, trailing twelve-month sales below $1 million, or where a consensus long-term growth forecast is not available. We also restrict the maximum and minimum values of MARGIN, GROWTH, LEVERAGE, ROR and RDINT to the trimmed values from the estimation sample and eliminate influential observations (leverage values exceeding 2.0). The sign of the prediction error is reversed when the observed market multiple denominator is negative so that "positive" prediction errors can be interpreted as indicating that the shares are over-priced.
same way they price the shares of estimation firms (i.e., by assigning a multiple of 20 to GAAP earnings), the resulting prediction errors will equal zero.
On the other hand, suppose investors ignore GAAP earnings when pricing the shares of pro forma firms and instead assign a market multiple of 20 to the pro forma (not GAAP) earnings numbers reported by these firms. The prediction process would then "warranted" multiples that are systematically smaller than the observed GAAP earnings multiples of pro forma firms. The resulting prediction errors would be positive in direction, and vary in cross-section with the magnitude of the pro forma adjustments made by sample firms. Our tests for differential pricing of pro forma and estimation sample firms are thus designed to:
(i) isolate any systematic pattern in the market model prediction errors of pro forma firms, and (ii) identify the disclosure characteristics (if any) associated with these prediction errors.
Price-level test results.
Panel A of Table 4 reports prediction error summary statistics for each valuation model.
Evidence as to whether investors assign a higher market multiple to pro forma firms than they do to estimation sample (hereafter GAAP) firms is mixed. For example, although the mean prediction error is reliably positive and economically significant in every case, median prediction errors are not reliably positive across valuation models. A similar pattern of results holds for mean and median studentized prediction errors that control for differences in the scale and sampling error of warranted multiples (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim and Wasserman 1996) . Moreover, only about 46 percent of the prediction errors for EVS and PB multiples are positive, and the proportion of positive prediction errors for the three PE multiples range from 48.6 percent (for Zacks "actual" earnings) to 57.0 percent (for "adjusted" GAAP earnings).
Figure 2 presents additional evidence on the distribution of studentized prediction errors (SPE) for pro forma firms. Figure 2a plots the median SPE from each valuation model and for twenty portfolios of pro forma firms. To construct this figure, we first sort GAAP firms by market multiple into twenty portfolios of equal size for each valuation model. We then assign each pro forma firm to one of the twenty portfolios using market multiple cutoff values from the GAAP sample sort. Pro forma firms with the lowest market multiple are assigned to group 1, while firms with the highest market multiple are assigned to group 20.
If investors price pro forma firms the same way they price GAAP firms, the median SPEs in Figure 2a will be clustered around zero. Figure 2b reports the percentage of pro forma firms assigned to each portfolio.
Two features of the data in Figure 2 are noteworthy. First, the median SPE for each market multiple is approximately zero for most (but not all) of the twenty portfolios depicted in Figure 2a . This pattern of results underscores the pervasive tendency for observed market multiples of pro forma firms to correspond closely to their warranted value estimates. At the same time, large positive SPEs are associated with pro forma firms assigned to the two extreme market multiple portfolios. Consider, for example, the results in Figure 2a for PE multiples. Not only are the shares of pro forma firms assigned to portfolio 1 (large negative PE multiples) seemingly over-priced relative to their warranted value estimates, but the magnitude of this apparent over-pricing increases substantially for pro forma firms assigned to portfolio 20 (large positive PE multiples). The central message from Figure 2b is that pro forma firms are not uniformly distributed across the twenty portfolios. Instead, the pro forma sample is over-represented in the upper five EVS and PB portfolios (64.1% and 43.8%, respectively) and in the bottom three and top two PE portfolios (62.3% on average across the three PE measures).
The clustering of pro forma firms in extreme portfolios can lead to spurious inferences about mispricing if the SPEs for extreme estimation sample firms also differ systematically from zero. To control for this possibility, we perform the following regression analysis for each market multiple:
where SPE is the studentized prediction error for pro forma firm i, SPE_P is the market multiple portfolio mean studentized prediction error for GAAP firms, and SPE_NE is the portfolio mean studentized prediction error for GAAP "new economy" firms or zero as is assigned a value of zero if the pro forma firm is not a "new economy" stock; otherwise SPE_NE is the market multiple portfolio mean SPE for GAAP "new economy" firms. The regression thus controls for two sources of potential error in our pro forma warranted multiple estimates-one associated with extremely large or small market multiples, and one associated with the market multiples for "new economy" firms.
The results of this analysis are reported in panel B of This means that the observed PE multiples for pro forma firms tend to exceed their warranted PE multiple estimates even after controlling for potential errors in the estimation process. But is this apparent over-pricing related to the disclosure strategy adopted by pro forma firms?
To investigate this question, we regress pro forma SPEs on seven explanatory variables after controlling for SPE_P and SPE_NE. Two indicator variables (PROFORMA and CASH_EPS) capture information about the label firms use when describing their pro forma earnings numbers. These variables equal 1 when the label is "pro forma" or "cash earnings" The results of this analysis are reported in panel C of Table 4 . These results indicate that the labels firms use to describe their pro forma earnings and the magnitude of the pro forma earnings adjustment do not explain the higher market multiples assigned to these firms since the coefficient estimates for PROFORMA, CASH_EPS, and AMOUNT are not statistically different from zero. The TRANS_LOSS coefficient estimate is also not statistically different from zero indicating that investors do not assign higher (or lower) multiples to firms that report pro forma profits and GAAP losses. The COVERAGE coefficient is reliably positive 19 There is little multicollinearity present among these variables. The two indicator variables PROFORMA and CASH_EPS are correlated at -0.50, but the remaining bivariate correlations are quite modest and range from -0.16 (CASH_EPS and TRANS_LOSS) to 0.22 (INST_OWNER and COVERAGE).
in four cases, INST_OWNER is reliably negative twice, and FIRSTCALL is statistically negative once. The most important result in panel C, however, is that the intercept coefficient associated with each multiple is no longer statistically different from zero.
Taken together, the results in Table 4 and Figure 2 indicate that pro forma firms do not appear to have traded at a market premium (or discount) during our sample period. After controlling for potential misspecification errors in the estimation process, we find that SPEs are unrelated to characteristics of the pro forma earnings disclosures themselves. In other words, our market multiple tests of price levels do not support the notion that pro forma firms are systematically priced differently than GAAP firms. We now turn our attention to the behavior of stock returns at quarterly earnings announcement dates when pro forma earnings numbers are made public.
Returns tests for earnings announcement effects.
If investors react to pro forma earnings information and price pro forma firms differently than they do GAAP firms, these share price differences ought to be evident in the behavior of stock returns to quarterly earnings announcements. After all, these announcements (made via press releases and conferences calls) are the vehicles firms use to convey their pro forma results. The empirical tests described in this section focus on earnings announcement stock returns for the second quarter of 2000.
Two returns windows are examined: a three-day window centered on the earnings announcement date, and a twenty-two day window ending one day after the earnings announcement date. The three-day window has the advantage of better isolating the share price response to definitive second quarter earnings announcements. However, the twentytwo day window allows for the possibility that some firms may pre-announce their quarterly earnings in advance of the official ("definitive") release (Soffer, Walther and Thiagarajan 2000) . Stock returns are cumulated over each window and adjusted for market-wide factors using the CRSP equally weighted stock return index. The mean three-day stock return for pro forma firms is -1.49 percent and significantly smaller than the 0.48 percent mean return for GAAP firms. When the return window is extended to cover possible earnings pre-announcements, the pattern reverses. The mean twenty-two day return for pro forma firms is 3.78 percent and significantly larger than the 0.88 percent mean return for GAAP firms. Untabulated results reveal mixed evidence about the stock return behavior of portfolios formed on selected characteristics of the pro forma disclosures. For example, the mean three-day return for TRANS_LOSS firms that reported pro forma profits and GAAP losses is -3.71 percent and significant, but the twenty-two day return for this portfolio is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Explicit use of the phrase "pro forma" in an earnings release is associated with a mean twenty-two day return of 6.88
Returns test results.
percent, but the mean three-day return is indistinguishable from zero. Portfolio returns for CASH_EPS, FIRSTCALL, and "first use" pro forma firms are not different from zero. Table 5 shows that the mean consensus forecast of second quarter earnings for pro forma firms is $0.09 per share, substantially bel ow the $0.30 per share forecast for GAAP firms.
Twenty-eight percent of the pro forma firms were forecasted to have a loss that quarter compared to only 14 percent of GAAP firms. However, the size of the forecasted loss (about $0.33 per share) is essentially the same for the two groups. The mean (median) scaled earnings surprise for pro forma firms is 16.03 (7.02) percent and significantly larger than the 6.32 (4.00) percent for GAAP firms. Over 60 percent of the earnings surprises for each group are positive.
Two additional tests are conducted in an attempt to unravel these findings. The first test controls for differences (if any) in the earnings surprise distributions of the two groups. We first sort GAAP firms by earnings surprise into twenty portfolios of equal size. Pro forma sample firms are then assigned to one of the twenty portfolios using cutoff values from the GAAP sample sort. Pro forma firms with the lowest earnings surprise are assigned to group 1, and firms with the highest earnings surprise are assigned to group 20. The second test sharpens this analysis by estimating two cross-sectional models of earnings announcement stock returns using variables that include the earnings surprise and its interaction with accounting losses, new economy firms, and pro forma firms. Each model is first estimated over the combined sample but without allowing for intercept and slope coefficients unique to pro forma firms. Expanded models incorporating these incremental coefficients are then estimated. One or more of these incremental coefficients will be reliably different from zero if pro forma firms are priced differently than GAAP firms at the earnings announcement date.
The first benchmark (i.e., excluding pro forma coefficients) regression model of stock returns is:
where CAR is the three-day (twenty-two day) market-adjusted stock return; SURPRISE is Benchmark and expanded regression model results are reported in Table 6 for both stock return cumulation periods. When the first benchmark model is estimated using a three-day CAR, the unconditional intercept term (λ 0 ) and the SURPRISE coefficient (λ 3 ) are both positive and significant. This result is well established in the literature. The LOSS and intercept coefficient is negative and significant indicating that investors penalize firms that report GAAP operating losses. The incremental slope coefficient (λ 4 ) is also negative and significant indicating that loss firms have a lower stock return per unit of earnings surprise than do profitable firms. A similar pattern of coefficient estimates is observed when the benchmark regression is estimated using a twenty-two day return cumulation period, except that neither intercept coefficient is statistically significant at conventional levels.
All four incremental coefficients for pro forma firms are statistically different from zero when the first benchmark model is estimated using a three-day CAR. The negative earnings SURPRISE slope coefficient and negative intercept terms suggest that investors penalize pro forma firms at the earnings announcement date. This effect is attenuated for pro forma firms that report GAAP operating losses as indicated by the positive and significant λ 4 coefficient.
However, none of these pro forma coefficients are statistically significant when returns are cumulated over the twenty-two day window to capture potentia l pre-announcement activity.
After controlling for new economy membership and earnings growth forecasts in the second benchmark regression model, the incremental coefficients associated with pro forma firms are-with two exceptions-statistically indistinguishable from zero for both three-day and twenty-two day returns. The absence of statistically significant incremental coefficients associated with earnings SURPRISE is particularly informative. This finding means that investors do not respond differently to the earnings information provided by pro forma firms.
The incremental coefficient (λ 3 ) denoting pro forma firms with operating losses in new economy industries is negative and significant for three-day returns but not for twenty-two day returns. Moreover, the incremental slope coefficient for GROWTH is positive and significant for twenty-two day returns but not three-day returns.
The central message of Table 6 is that the stock return behavior of pro forma firms at the earnings announcement date does not appear to differ from that of other firms in our sample after controlling for GAAP operating losses, new economy membership, and forecasted EPS growth. Untabulated results show that this conclusion also holds when the pro forma sample is restricted to: (1) firms that explicitly use the phrase "pro forma" or "cash earnings" in their press release; (2) firms that report pro forma profits but GAAP losses for the quarter; (3) firms for which this was the first quarter (or, in a separate analysis, first or second quarter) of pro forma disclosure strategy use; and (4) "aggressive" firms that report pro forma EPS in excess of the Zacks "actual" EPS for the quarter. The pro forma incremental coefficients associated with these sample partitions are generally i ndistinguishable from zero for both three-day and twenty-two day returns. 
Additional price-level test results.
Given the widespread use of residual income valuation models in academic research (Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Kothari, 2001 ), we performed a second series of price level tests substituting residual income models for the market multiple models described earlier.
Three different specifications are used. The first residual income model includes equity book value and GAAP earnings per share, along with additional explanatory variables that control for loss firms and negative book equity firms (i.e., intercept and slope coefficient terms associated with NOPROFIT and NEGCE as described previously). The other two specifications replaced GAAP earnings with "adjusted" GAAP earnings per share and Zacks "actual" earnings per share, respectively. As before, the approach involves constructing pro forma firm warranted values from regression model parameter estimates for firms that did not use the pro forma disclosure strategy. Our price level tests are then based on prediction errors defined as the actual share price of each pro forma firm minus the corresponding warranted value estimate.
Consistent with prior results in the literature, we find that estimation sample equity book value and earnings both exert a reliably positive influence on share price in the residual income valuation model. Moreover, the presence of operating losses is associated with a statistically significant increase in the equity book value coefficient and a significant decrease in the earnings coefficient. The incremental intercept and slope coefficients associated with the presence of negative book equity are not different from zero in our sample. The explanatory power of the residual income model for estimation sample firms is, however, quite low. The regression r-squares range from 23.7 percent for GAAP earnings to 24.9 percent for adjusted GAAP earnings.
The observed stock prices of pro forma firms tend to be larger than the warranted value estimates produced by the residual income models. The mean and median prediction error and studentized prediction error (SPE) are positive and significant across the three earnings measures, and more than 62 percent of the individual SPEs are greater than zero. A 20 The pro forma slope coefficient estimate for GROWTH was statistically positive in one sample partition while the LOSS x NEW_ECON intercept coefficient was statistically negative twice. Sixty-four individual coefficient estimates were computed for purposes of this analysis (8 incremental coefficients x 4 sample partitions x 2 stock return windows), and the occasional presence of a reliably nonzero coefficient estimate is consistent with sampling error. modified version of the regression model described in Panel C of Table 4 is used to isolate factors associated with the degree of apparent mispricing. The two modifications are: (1) the model is augmented to included Zacks' consensus forecast of earnings GROWTH, a variable present in the market multiple valuation models but one that is absent from the residual income model; and (2) the variable SPE_P (SPE_NE) is remeasured as the portfolio mean SPE for ("new economy") estimation sample firms in the same share price-rather than market multiple -portfolio as the pro forma firm.
The results confirm our earlier findings. Estimation sample SPEs and earnings growth forecasts explain a substantial portion of the cross-sectional variation in prediction errors for pro forma firms. These variables alone produce regression r-squares that range from 49 percent to 51 percent across earnings measures. The coefficient estimate for COVERAGE by analysts is positive and significant in each case, while FIRSTCALL is negative and significant. Coefficient estimates for the remaining explanatory variables (PROFORMA, CASH_EPS, AMOUNT, TRANS_LOSS, and INST_OWNER) and for the unconditioned regression intercept term are statistically indistinguishable from zero. In other words, our residual income valuation model tests do not support the notion that investors price pro forma firms differently than they price other firms.
Conclusions
This paper documents the frequency and magnitude of pro forma earnings reported by firms in their quarterly earnings press releases issued following the second calendar quarter of 2000 and describes the 433 firms that engaged in this financial disclosure strategy. We find that income-increasing pro forma adjustments to GAAP EPS dominate the sample, although some highly profitable firms occasionally make income-decreasing pro forma adjustments. Our ability to calibrate the magnitude of individual pro forma adjustments is hampered by firms' use of rather vague categories (e.g., "restructuring charges", "mergerrelated expenses", or "unusual charges") to describe the expenses excluded from their pro forma results and by the absence of detailed reconciliations to GAAP earnings. We also find that pro forma EPS equals the "actual" (or "Street") EPS figure reported by Zacks Investment Research in about 59 percent of the cases; however, when the two figures differ it is because the income-increasing adjustments to GAAP earnings made by Zacks are smaller than those made by the firms themselves.
The central purpose of this paper is to present evidence on whether investors are misled by pro forma earnings disclosures. We use a market multiples approach (Liu, Nissim and Thomas 2000; Bhojraj and Lee 2002) to determine if investors assign a higher (or lower) share price to pro forma firms than they do to firms that do not use this disclosure strategy.
We find no evidence that pro forma firms are priced differently than GAAP firms for our sample period. Similarly, we find no evidence of a stock return premium (or penalty) for pro forma firms at the earnings announcement date. Collectively, our results provide evidence that investors were not misled, on average, by pro forma earnings disclosures issued during June through August 2000.
Our findings contribute to two related streams of research on stock prices and earnings information. One research stream examines the share price implications of so-called "special items" that represent nonrecurring charges to net income (e.g., Burghstahler, Jiambalvo and Shevlin 1999; Collins, Maydew and Weiss 1997; Elliot and Hanna 1996) and of accounting goodwill amortization (e.g., Lindenberg and Ross 1999; Moehrle, ReynoldsMoehrle and Wallace 2001; Vincent 1997) . Management-initiated pro forma adjustments for "special items" and goodwill amortization occur frequently in our sample. Our results are consistent with prior evidence indicating that share prices are influenced little by these two components of GAAP earnings because investors correctly recognize the transitory nature of special items and that goodwill amortization has no impact of firm cash flows.
A second research stream examines the relative information content of the pro forma earnings numbers that firms disclose in their press releases (Lougee and Marquardt 2002; Bhattacharya, et al. 2002) . The general tenor of the evidence from these studies is that pro forma earnings is more informative for equity valuation purposes than is GAAP operating earnings, and exhibits a stronger association with analysts' earnings forecast revisions.
However, Bhattacharya, et al. (2002) also find that pro forma earnings are less informative and persistent than is the "Street" earnings from I/B/E/S. These result are consistent with our finding that investors do not seem to focus myopically on the earnings number reported in the press release headline and lead paragraph, but instead consider a richer set of information when evaluating firm performance.
Our results complement Schrand and Walther's (2000) research on strategic disclosure of prior period gains and losses. Their results indicate that investors fail to adjust for yearago gains when the transitory item is not disclosed again in the current quarter earnings press release. However, investors correctly adjust when firms strategically choose to remind them about year-ago losses. Our study investigates strategic disclosure of current quarter earnings performance. Like Schrand and Walther (2000) , we find that investors appear to read the entire earnings press release and to price the firm's shares accordingly.
There are two important caveats to this study. One caveat is that our evidence should be interpreted as pertaining to the way in which investors price the "average" firm in our sample rather than to how each individual pro forma firm is priced. The possibility remains that some pro forma firms are mispriced and that some investors are occasionally misled by pro forma disclosures. For example, our results are consistent with the notion that sophistic ated investors arbitrage away any temporary price premium (or penalty) assigned to pro forma firms by unsophisticated investors who are misled by the disclosure strategy. Our a. Median pro forma and "actual" EPS for the quarter b. Difference in median pro forma and two "actual" EPS amounts for the quarter Both figures are constructed by sorting the data into twenty profitability groups using GAAP EPS (Panel A) or Zacks "actual" EPS (Panel B). Sample firms with the lowest EPS are assigned to group 1, and firms with the highest EPS are assigned to group 20. GAAP EPS is the firm's "as reported" fully diluted earnings per share. Adjusted GAAP EPS excludes extraordinary and "special" items as identified by Compustat. Zacks "actual" EPS figures exclude certain (unspecified) GAAP items because they are presumably not included in analysts' EPS forecasts. Figure 1b omits one observation (group 1 adjusted GAAP EPS of $0.66) to improve the clarity of the data plot. Both figures are constructed by sorting GAAP estimation sample firms by earnings surprise into twenty portfolios of equal size. Pro forma sample firms are then assigned to one of the twenty portfolios using cutoff values from the GAAP estimation sample sort. Pro forma firms with the lowest earnings surprise are assigned to group 1, and firms with the highest earnings surprise are assigned to group 20. Earnings surprise is the Zacks' "adjusted" EPS minus the last consensus EPS forecast, divided by the absolute value of the forecast. unspecificed "noncash" charges, and miscellaneous items Amounts labeled as "nonrecurring" and "special" items Restructuring costs and severence charges Asset sales and equity investment gains and losses Deferred compensation, financing charges, management fees, "nonoperating" items, Amortization of goodwill Stock-based compensation including payroll taxes on exercised stock options Purchased in-process R&D charges Depreciation and depletion Amortization of (unspecified) intangibles Pro forma earnings, net income or loss Cash earnings, net income or loss "Adjusted" earnings, net income or loss Earnings (loss) "before" or "excluding" various items Table 1 . continued Pro forma and GAAP earnings and EPS are amounts reported by the firms themselves. A second "adjusted" GAAP earnings and EPS figure that excludes extraordinary and "special" items (as defined by Compustat) is also reported in Panel A. Zacks Investment Research computes an "actual" EPS amount that excludes certain (unspecified) GAAP items because they were presumably not included in analysts' EPS forecasts. The Zacks "actual" earnings is "actual" EPS multiplied by the number of shares used to compute pro forma (and GAAP) EPS. Panel A reports the results from two-sample t-tests (Wilcoxon rank sum tests) of means (medians) comparing pro forma earnings and EPS to GAAP and Zacks "actual" values. A ** (*) denotes a statistically significant one-tailed test result at the .05 (.10) level. Table 3 .
Estimation Regressions for Market Multiple Valuation Models
The market multiples are enterprise value-to-sales (EVS), price-to-book (PB) and price-to-earnings (PE). The first PE multiple scales share price by trailing twelve-month GAAP net income before extraordinary items, the second multiple eliminates any "special items" from GAAP earnings, while the third multiple uses a trailing twelve-month Zacks "actual" earnings. The nine explanatory variables are defined as follows: I_EVS is the harmonic mean of the enterprise-value-to-sales ratio for all the firms in the same industry (two-digit SIC code); I_MB (I_PE) is the harmonic mean of the price-to-book (price-to-earnings) ratio for all firms in the same industry; MARGIN is the industry -adjusted operating profit margin computed as the difference between the firm's profit margin (operating profits divided by sales) and the median industry profit margin; L_MARGIN is an interaction term computed as MARGIN multiplied by an indicator variable that equals 1 if MARGIN is less than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise; I_GROWTH is the industry -adjusted growth forecast computed as the difference between the Zacks consensus growth forecast for the firm and the industry median growth forecast; LEVERAGE is total long-term debt plus preferred stock scaled by the book value of common equity; ROR is the firm's return-on-net-assets (when EVS is the market multiple) or return-on equity (when PB or PE is the market multiple); and RDINT is R&D intensity defined as total research and development expenditures divided by sales. To accommodate the inclusion of loss firms in the PE multiple estimation sample, the explanatory variables are each multiplied by an indicator variable (NOPROFIT) which equals 1 if the earnings measure used in the PE multiple is less than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise. NEGCE_ROE controls for observations where common equity book value is negative and is defined as return-on-equity multiplied by an indicator variable (NEGCE) that equals 1 if common equity is negative, and 0 otherwise. A * (**) denotes a statistically significant coefficient estimate at the 0.05 (0.01) level using a conventional two-tailed t-test.
Table 4. Market Multiple Prediction Errors for Pro Forma Sample Firms
The regression dependent variables in panels B and C are studentized prediction errors (SPE) from the market multiple valuation models. SPE_P (SPE_NE) is the portfolio mean SPE for ("new economy") estimation sample firms in the same market multiple portfolio as the pro forma firm. The indicator variables PROFORMA and CASH_EPS equal 1 when the pro forma earnings number was labeled "pro forma" or "cash earnings" (including "cash loss"), respectively, and 0 otherwise. AMOUNT is pro forma EPS minus GAAP EPS for the quarter, scaled by closing share price. The indicator variable TRANS_LOSS equals 1 when pro forma earnings is positive but GAAP earnings is negative, and 0 otherwise. The indicator variable FIRSTCALL denotes "cash earnings" firms as designated by First Call Corporation. INST_OWNER is the percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, and COVERAGE is the number of analysts following the company. Statistically significance is denoted by a * (p < 0.05) or ** (p < 0.01). Table 5 .
Second Quarter 2000 Earnings Announcements
EPS forecast is the last consensus (mean) forecast for the quarter. Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of individual analysts' EPS forecasts. Forecast loss includes only those consensus EPS forecasts that are less than zero. Earnings surprise is the Zacks' "adjusted" EPS minus the last consensus EPS forecast, divided by the absolute value of the forecast. Three day (twenty-two day) stock return is the cumulative market-adjusted return for the period ending one day after the second quarter 2000 earnings announcement. Statistically significance is denoted by a * (p < 0.05) or ** (p < 0.01) for two-tailed tests of means (medians) different from zero. The mean and median for Forecast dispersion and Forecasted losses differ from zero by construction. Two-sample p values are significance levels for a comparison of group means. Table 6 .
Regression Tests for Differential Pricing of Pro Forma Firms Around Second Quarter 2000 Earnings Announcements
The regression dependent variable is a three-day (twenty-two day) cumulative market-adjusted stock return for the period ending one day after the second quarter 2000 earnings announcement. The indicator variable LOSS equals 1 when GAAP EPS before special items is negative, and 0 otherwise. The indicator variable NEW_ECON denotes firms in "new economy" industries. SURPRISE is the Zacks' "adjusted" EPS minus the last consensus EPS forecast, divided by the absolute value of the forecast. The interaction variables LOSS x SURPRISE, NEW_ECON x SURPRISE, and LOSS x NEW_ECON x SURPRISE allow the slope coefficient on SURPRISE to vary depending on LOSS, NEW_ECON, or the combination of these two factors. Statistically significance is denoted by a * (p < 0.05) or ** (p < 0.01). 
